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RITA COYLE DEMEULESt
Judge Donald P. Lay's decision to take senior status provides
an opportunity to revisit briefly some of the highlights of his
tenure as ChiefJudge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
My review of Judge Lay's opinions is aided by the invaluable
year I spent with him as one of his law clerks. Judge Lay's will-
ingness to teach his law clerks about a federal judge's decision-
making responsibilities revealed one of the important
principles that guided his judicial career. The hallmark of
Judge Lay's judicial career, including his tenure as Chief
Judge, must be his consistent requirement to uphold the con-
stitutional protections which have for over two hundred years
been extended to protect the individual rights of the citizens of
this country. His term as Chief Judge will surely be
remembered for the direction and guidance he provided in nu-
merous opinions regarding the sanctity of individual constitu-
tional rights.'
My time with Chief Judge Lay demonstrated that an increas-
ingly aggressive government threatened the protection of indi-
vidual rights as never before. At the same time, the increasing
threat of crime and the changing landscape of individual pri-
vacy concerns contributed to a gradual erosion of individual
rights.' Judge Lay, in his role as Chief Judge and the guiding
t Associate, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Former
Law Clerk to Chief Judge Lay, 1989-1990; Former Law Clerk to Justices Glenn Kelley
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1. See, e.g., United States v. Kroh, 915 F.2d 326, 342 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Lay, CJ., dissenting) (dissenting from majority opinion upholding criminal convic-
tion for conspiracy and fraud on grounds that defendant did not receive a fair trial).
2. This point is illustrated most graphically in the areas of abortion rights and
the use of habeas corpus for individuals convicted of crimes by state courts. For
example, the scope of the constitutional right to abortion has varied widely since that
right was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). The changing moral perception of abortion has led to a gradual change
in the standard of review used to evaluate abortion restrictions so that greater con-
trol over the availability of abortion has been returned to the states. See, e.g., Webster
v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (rejecting the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review and reviewing abortion regulations under an unclear, but most likely,
undue burden standard), rev'g, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, CJ.); see also
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (reviewing restrictions on minor's
right to abortion under lower standard adopted in Webster), afftg, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th
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force for the court, did not allow these threats to deter him
from enforcing the protections that are extended to individuals
by the United States Constitution. Judge Lay would spend
considerable amounts of time combing through trial tran-
scripts and trial court records to ensure that all possible steps
were taken to protect the constitutional rights of the litigant
whose life or liberty interests were at stake. Often, that pains-
taking review convinced the Chief Judge that the litigant's
rights had been protected sufficiently and that his role as a fed-
eral appeals court judge-upholding the Constitution-was
fulfilled.
On those occasions where Judge Lay discovered trial court
errors, or those instances where the government infringed on
constitutional rights, he did not hesitate to rebuke the offend-
ing party. Recently, Judge Lay's views were vindicated by the
United States Supreme Court inJacobson v. United States.' Jacob-
son provides an excellent review ofJudge Lay's approach to the
continuing struggle between the federal government's aggres-
sive enforcement of its laws, and the protection of the constitu-
tional rights guaranteed all citizens, regardless of the nature of
the crime with which they are charged.
The government's mission inJacobson was prosecuting child
pornography. Keith Jacobson became the target of a federal
government sting operation after his name was found on a
mailing list maintained by a dealer of both obscene and non-
obscene materials. Jacobson's only prior purchase from this
dealer had been material which at the time was considered
legal.4 Using five separate fictitious organizations, the govern-
ment for more than two years worked to get Jacobson to
purchase additional, and by then illegal, pornographic mate-
rial. When Jacobson finally ordered one magazine over
Cir. 1988); Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d 479, 486 n.13 (8th Cir. 1990)
(applying the Webster standard).
Similarly, the use of habeas corpus petitions to review the convictions of defend-
ants tried in state courts has recently been restricted substantially. See, e.g., Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Wabasha v. Solem, 694 F.2d 155, 159, 161 (8th Cir.
1982) (Lay, C.J., dissenting) ("The law abhors forfeiture.... Conscientious state and
federal trial judges should require much, much more before accepting a waiver of
counsel in criminal cases.").
3. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992). The Court's majority opinion, written by Justice
White, was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter and Thomas. Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented.
4. Id. at 1538.
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twenty-six months after the government's crusade began, he
was arrested. 5
Jacobson raised an entrapment defense, which was rejected
by the district court. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the ini-
tial panel agreed with Jacobson in an opinion written by Senior
Judge Heaney and reversed his conviction.6 On rehearing en
banc, the full court reversed the panel opinion and reinstated
Jacobson's conviction.7 Chief Judge Lay dissented from the
full court's opinion, pointing out that the government's actions
constituted the height of entrapment of an otherwise lawfully
acting individual:
I find the government's conduct in this case to be reprehen-
sible. The government invested considerable time and
money to prosecute a man who never would have commit-
ted a crime but for the government's encouragement. The
government should not concentrate its efforts on incrimi-
nating innocent individuals; rather it should strive to sup-
press criminal behavior. 8
The United States Supreme Court agreed with Chief Judge
Lay, stating that
by waving the banner of individual rights and disparaging
the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict the
availability of sexually explicit materials, the Government
not only excited UJacobson's] interest in sexually explicit
materials banned by law but also exerted substantial pres-
sure on petitioner to obtain and read such material as part
of a fight against censorship and infringement of individual
rights.... When the Government's quest for convictions
leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citi-
zen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never
run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene.'
Undoubtedly, defending the rights of convicted criminals
does not win popularity contests. However, the nature of the
crime or the criminal did not sway Chief Judge Lay from the
5. Id. at 1539.
6. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, vacated, 899 F.2d 1549 (8th Cir. 1990). The panel
members were Chief Judge Lay, Judge Fagg, and Senior Judge Heaney.
7. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
8. Id., at 471 (Lay, CJ., dissenting). Judge Heaney also dissented, arguing that
the government's conduct was "outrageous," violating all accepted due process stan-
dards. Id. at 471, 476 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
9. United States v. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992).
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oath which he took upon his appointment to the bench, to up-
hold the United States Constitution. Perhaps the oath is why
Judge Lay dissented from the en banc decision in United States
v. Kroh, voting instead to reverse the defendant's convictions
for fraud and conspiracy. '0 Or, perhaps the oath is why Judge
Lay dissented from the en banc decision in Hodgson v. Minne-
sota," involving the sensitive issues of abortion, parental
rights, and minors' rights to make an informed decision re-
garding abortion. Here, Judge Lay admonished the court to
remember its duty to uphold the Constitution. "As long as the
Constitution protects the right of a woman to have an abor-
tion, we are under a judicial mandate to evaluate state regula-
tions in terms of whether they impose undue burdens on the
exercise of that right."'
' 2
For me, Judge Lay's tenure as ChiefJudge of the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals will serve as a reminder of the impor-
tance of respecting your beliefs, regardless of their
unpopularity. For Judge Lay, the rights protected by the Con-
stitution are paramount. His years as Chief Judge will be
remembered for the fervor with which he respected the inter-
ests and rights of those individuals.
10. 915 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1990). Rejecting the assertion that jurors would not
realize that the defendant's co-conspirator was his brother where the government
brought out brother's plea bargain during trial, Judge Lay wrote, "If we believe in
this, we believe in tooth fairies." Id. at 338-39 (Lay, C.J. dissenting).
In fact, ChiefJudge Lay was very clear in explaining his concerns that the judici-
ary has an obligation to protect the rights of individuals: "This dissent is written
vigorously with the hope that trial judges exercise great care and oversight when the
government attempts to use guilty pleas of co-conspirators .... The need for a fair
trial should always be paramount to the government's quest to obtain a conviction at
any cost." Id. at 342.
11. 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
12. Id. at 1471 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
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